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Or, On Ricoeurian, Confucian, and Aztec Philosophy 
Sebastian Purcell 
SUNY at Cortland 
On the Internal Crisis of Hermeneutics 
The purpose of this essay is to assess the present state of hermeneutics as 
a philosophical program and, as a result, to suggest some new avenues for its 
development. Specifically, I forward two closely related new directions for 
hermeneutical philosophy, namely that by way of global comparative 
philosophy, and that by way of syncretic philosophy. The reasons for the 
proposed developments turn on a difficulty that especially faces Paul 
Ricoeur’s formulation of hermeneutics. Given the accuracy of his challenge to 
Martin Heidegger’s “short road,” and the broader methodological similarities 
that Ricoeur shares with Hans Georg Gadamer, I see no other alternative path 
forward for the philosophical program.1  
Notably, the present challenge is one that has emerged internally from 
proponents of philosophical hermeneutics and scholars of Ricoeur’s 
philosophy in particular. It is one that Scott Davidson raises in his essay 
“Intersectional Hermeneutics,” and it is one that Richard Kearney has at least 
implicitly endorsed in his turn to formulate a “carnal hermeneutics.”2 Unlike 
Alain Badiou’s criticisms, or those that proponents of deconstruction forward, 
this challenge hits its mark precisely because it goes to the heart of how the 
hermeneutic circle of reflective inquiry is supposed to operate.3 It does not 
deny the major premises of the program, then, but grants that they are true, 
and concludes, nevertheless, that philosophical hermeneutics cannot function 
as Ricoeur supposed. The matter is thus a serious one, and if no alternative 
proved viable, then I think that philosophical hermeneutics would stand as 
only a topic of historical interest, no longer a living philosophical tradition. 
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Fortunately for proponents of hermeneutics, there are several paths 
forward, as both Davidson and Kearney have developed the contours of their 
own new programs. What the present essay adds are two more paths. Unlike 
Davidson and Kearney’s paths, however, the two I propose, i.e., the 
comparative and syncretic paths, draw directly from Ricoeur’s own 
philosophical work by developing the model of translation that he forwards 
late in his career, rather than attempting to replace his hermeneutic models 
with a new one.4 An additional advantage is that my proposal links 
hermeneutical philosophy to the world’s philosophical traditions, so that 
hermeneutics may profitably engage in the new “global turn” in philosophy. 
Since the matter is complex, I begin with the way in which Ricoeur develops 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics. 
From Heidegger’s to Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics 
To understand the character of what might be called “Davidson’s 
collapse challenge” to philosophical hermeneutics, it helps to take a step back 
and ask what the hermeneutic circle was supposed to consist of. Why, after 
all, did hermeneutics, a practice of reading Biblical texts, become a 
philosophical position—something approaching both a method and an 
epistemological outlook?5 The short answer, and one that will be sufficient for 
our purposes, best emerges by recalling the reasons that motivated Ricoeur to 
develop Heidegger’s hermeneutics in the first place.  
We can start at the beginning. Heidegger first grafts the practice of 
hermeneutics onto the program of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology in his 
lectures which now make up the volume titled History of the Concept of Time. 
What Heidegger argues there is that Husserl’s account of truth, his 
phenomenological sense that is supposed to serve as the conceptual basis for 
mathematical and scientific truth claims, presupposes a further dimension. 
Suppose that I have my back to the blackboard, and someone claims that the 
blackboard is askew. At this point, I do not know whether that proposition 
“the blackboard is askew” is true. When I turn around, I recognize the 
phenomenological evidence that would satisfy the proposition as true, and so 
I recognize its truth.6 Yet, this adequation of mind and reality in 
phenomenological evidence presupposes something further, Heidegger 
argues. I need to have an understanding of the preconceptually articulated 
world that includes blackboards and things hanging askew for those words 
to have any meaning—for me or anyone else.7 In Being and Time, Heidegger 
argues that this further world (Umwelt) of sense that gives things their 
meaning is their Being (Sein). Individual beings, then, presuppose Being (Sein) 
for their meaning.8 
Heidegger argues further that the totality of all meanings that make up 
Being is itself historically conditioned.9 To put the point intuitively, some 
things can appear to me as space shuttles, but they could never do so for 
Aristotle. The reason is that the Sein of beings for Aristotle held that beyond 
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the moon was only ether, so that nothing could even travel out of orbit, and 
he had no conception of physical forces explained quantitively as we have. 
The Being of beings, then, turns on one’s place in history, and the character of 
that history shifts. For Heidegger, in fact, there has only been one such shift, 
and it is that which occurred when the pre-Socratic sense of truth (alētheia) 
changed to become a verifiable, or technological, sense of truth, either in 
Plato’s Republic or Aristotle’s logic. The most basic sense of a being, such as a 
blackboard, then, is not Being, but the historical changing of Being as a 
configuration—what Heidegger in his later career called an Event (Ereignis).10 
The epistemological challenge in articulating just in what the most basic 
sense of being consists thus turns on speaking about a topic that is deeply 
prereflective. The world that makes sense of beings like blackboards, space-
shuttles, and even people, is not something about which one is ordinarily 
aware. I mostly notice my car, for example, when it breaks down.11 Only 
specific modes of conscious awareness, then, reveal a being to me as an object 
for reflection. And if it is difficult for the Being of individual beings to emerge 
into my awareness, then the Being of Being itself, the Event, is by that same 
measure even more difficult. To achieve that stage of awareness, one needs a 
special reflective approach. We shall have to identify a mood of consciousness 
that brings beings as a whole into awareness, such as anxiety, and then 
articulate that mood.12 At various points in his career Heidegger called this 
approach “hermeneutics,” because the reflection he employed on the 
appropriate moods of consciousness required interpretation (Auslegung) in 
the way that reflection on the meaning of Biblical texts do.13 
These points, in outline, suggest the reasons why hermeneutics, a practice 
of reflection on Biblical texts, became a philosophical outlook that is at once 
epistemological and methodological in character. Now, to understand 
Ricoeur’s criticism of Heidegger, why it is that he thought Heidegger’s 
approach would never work, it is helpful to begin with Heidegger’s own self-
criticism.  
The hermeneutic circle for Heidegger consists in the fact that we (always) 
already have an understanding of the Being of beings, but that we need to 
articulate this prior awareness. We need to move from our prereflective 
understanding of beings, first into a mood that highlights them, then into a 
stage of deliberate reflection on that mood called hermeneutics, and finally 
we hope to arrive at a reflective understanding of the being under 
consideration. At least, that is the approach for ordinary beings. In the case of 
the Event itself, since it is hardly comprehensible, the best that one can do is 
to bring reflective thought to its limits and to recognize those limits—what 
John Sallis, in his scholarship, has called “the verge.”14 In Being and Time, what 
Heidegger sought to do was to bring his readers to that verge by reflecting on 
the specific being who asks the question of Being, namely the human being 
(Dasein). Heidegger later recognized this approach to be in error because the 
very strategy of addressing the character of reality by way of asking about the 
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limits of human beings is part of the particular Western approach to the 
topic—it is René Descartes and Immanuel Kant’s approach par excellence—and 
Heidegger wants to get at the Being of all Being, the Event, not only Being of 
Western Being. This shortcoming explains why, in his later career, Heidegger 
undertook to deconstruct Western philosophy as a path to bring our 
understanding to the verge of thought—and it is this self-assessment that led 
him to the serious study of the pre-Socratics.15 
What Ricoeur discerns in Heidegger’s work, whether early or late, is an 
error in argumentative strategy. Ricoeur’s early career objection to Heidegger, 
and what I have developed at length elsewhere, holds that there is no way, in 
principle, that Heidegger could complete his task.16 The reasons turn on three 
misunderstandings. The first is that the strategy of questioning back (rukfrage) 
from a given (e.g., the hanging of a blackboard) to its condition (e.g. the 
board’s phenomenological evidence) is a broadly transcendental strategy of 
argument. Kant uses this strategy in all three of his critiques. Yet, as Kant 
outlines in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, one must not only 
regress to some prior condition x, one must also show that the x is the only 
possible (or only adequate) explanation available.17 Otherwise, it would be 
possible to argue that the given is explained by anything at all. The truth of 
the blackboard’s hanging, for example, could be explained as the result of an 
evil genius who makes me perceive it that way. Thus, Heidegger first 
mistakenly uses the transcendental method. 
Second, Heidegger mischaracterizes the truth of mathematics and the 
natural sciences in trying to question back from (or dig beneath) them. The 
now discredited positivist view on these disciplines holds that they simply 
yield an ever-expanding reservoir of truths. But since Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, philosophers of science have recognized that 
this is not a plausible view of the matter (even if Kuhn’s own view has needed 
significant modification).18 Because mathematical and scientific truth is not 
static in the way required, there is simply no given to question back from to 
some prior level x. There is simply no “truth” of mathematics and science as 
Heidegger requires. 
Finally, Heidegger mistakenly conceives of the beings of our awareness 
as obstacles to be explained, as givens to reason from, supposing that they are 
highlighted in specific conscious states. But if our conscious awareness is not 
so obvious as we naturally suppose, if Sigmund Freud is right about at least 
that much, then the objects themselves are more likely to serve as points of 
reflection than moods of conscious awareness. Hermeneutics must be about 
the objects and persons of the world, not our mind’s supposedly clear 
interiority. For all these reasons, the promised return road that would have 
completed Being and Time proves to be impossible even in principle. 
The third criticism, for Ricoeur, nevertheless points the way forward. If 
hermeneutics is not supposed to investigate conscious moods, but rather the 
5 0  |  H e r m e n e u t i c ,  C o m p a r a t i v e ,  a n d  S y n c r e t i c  P h i l o s o p h y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVIII, No 2 (2020)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2020.935 
objects that are the production of our conscious states, then one must take the 
long path of traversing through all relevant productions, rather than through 
Heidegger’s short road that makes use of a single (or a handful) of states.19 
This long road of traversal, from a given object of meaning 
precomprehensively grasped, through a moment of articulate reflection, and 
to a moment of secondary comprehension, is what characterizes the circle of 
hermeneutic reflection for Ricoeur. Nevertheless, it is also not without its own 
challenge. 
Davidson’s Collapse Challenge for Ricoeur 
On the Ricoeurian model of hermeneutics, one is to begin with a given 
that is prereflectively understood (in Heideggerianese: precomprehensively 
grasped). Then one reflects on that given in an articulate way, only to return, 
finally, to the given as it was, but now refigured by way of reflection. Ricoeur 
called this last stage “appropriation,” as it was his rearticulation of G. W. F. 
Hegel’s Aufhebung.20  To express the same strategy differently, Ricoeur liked 
to say that one begins with a naïve given, passes through a moment of 
suspicion, to be returned to the phenomenon in a second naivete.  
The specifics of Ricoeur’s method matter for Davidson’s collapse 
challenge. For much of Ricoeur’s career the second stage of reflective 
articulation, the moment of suspicion, made use of structuralist methods. This 
seems to have had a double purpose. First, structuralist explanations are often 
counterintuitive, and so helpfully challenge one’s naïve view of the 
phenomenon under consideration.  Second, Ricoeur held that structuralism 
offered a mode of explanation that was appropriate to human disciplines and 
so was different from scientific explanation.21 Ricoeurian hermeneutics, in 
short, is largely tied to structuralism in its methodological execution. 
 It is at this point that Davidson’s challenge enters the philosophical 
stage. For Davidson, the problem is not, as some had argued, that 
structuralism plays only a limited role in Ricoeur’s philosophy,  
it is that it is granted any role at all. Today structuralism is 
purely a historical artifact. In disciplines ranging from 
linguistics to literary theory to anthropology, structuralism 
has been refuted, debunked and dismissed. As a linguistic 
theory, it has been criticized for reducing language to a 
static system and ignoring the question of the production 
of linguistic meaning (Chomsky 1979). In the domain of 
literary criticism, its focus on discovering the deep 
structure of texts has been rejected for blurring over 
significant textual details that differentiate texts. In 
anthropology, it has been criticized for imposing a 
theoretical construct that is not supported by empirical 
facts about culture (Lett 1987).22 
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In short, structuralism has collapsed as a program of investigation. Insofar as 
Ricoeur’s account of hermeneutics is tied to its methods, it likewise sinks. First 
naiveté and second supposedly gained after long traversal thus collapse 
together. That, in brief, is Davidson’s collapse challenge. 
 To my mind, Davidson’s criticism hits its mark. To deny it, one would 
have to show that, somehow, Ricoeur did not mean to use structuralism as he 
did. Or, since that is not possible, that some number of his investigations 
made use of other modes of explanation. 
 For his part, Davidson argues that one could reconstruct Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics by replacing his structuralist moment of explanation with a 
multidimensional model, which he calls an “intersectional model.” “The main 
flaw in Ricoeur’s account of explanation,” he writes, “is more profound than 
his adherence to structuralism. It might have to do with the fact that 
structuralism is a ‘single-axis’ method of explanation.”23 Because phenomena 
are plurivocal in their meaning, a model that aims at identifying only one axis 
of meaning is bound to be the wrong approach generally. Instead, Davidson 
develops Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional approach to categories of 
oppression to achieve the stated aim.24 
 Richard Kearney has to some extent followed the other path left open, 
namely that many of Ricoeur’s investigations did not make use of structuralist 
explanation, and these can profitably be developed. Specifically, Kearney uses 
Ricoeur’s early work on philosophical anthropology to develop an embodied, 
carnal hermeneutics. Despite his recourse to Ricoeur’s work, however, 
Kearney’s articulation leans on Merleau-Ponty’s insight that our bodies 
schematize the world, so that it is possible to use this framework to come to 
understand our prereflective grasp of meaningful symbols, texts, and 
translations.25 
 Both paths, to my mind, prove workable, but they share something in 
common: they both replace Ricoeur’s moment of explanation with something 
else. In Davidson’s case, it is Crenshaw’s intersectional categories, while in 
Kearney’s it is a development of Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment. Might not a 
more sensible path be to look for an alternative model of explanation within 
Ricoeur’s own work? This is the path I propose, because I think that Ricoeur’s 
translation model of explanation escapes Davidson’s collapse. 
The Translation Model 
In Ricoeur’s career, he came to understand that the givens for reflective 
understanding cluster around different units of analysis. The symbol, which 
animated his early work, operates at the level of the word in context. The 
metaphor, which followed closely after, operates at the level of the sentence. 
The text, finally, finds meaning in a work as a whole and cannot be reduced 
to the meaning of individual sentences or their sum.26 It was a surprise to 
Ricoeur, then, that translations would form their own sort of given meaning. 
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Even more surprisingly, they look to operate at the level of a whole culture.27 
As a result of this unique position, of all the models of meaning at work in 
Ricoeur’s thought, it is the translation model that most directly puts into 
question the Being of beings; it is also a model that could not possibly make 
use of structuralist explanations.  
To understand it, one might begin with the initial animating concern of 
Ricoeur’s inquiry when he addresses the topic of translation, namely how is 
translation among languages, especially widely divergent languages, even 
possible? The given with which Ricoeur begins his reflective project is thus 
double. It concerns both the diversity of languages, symbolically expressed in 
the Bible’s myth of Babel,28 and the fact of translation everywhere in human 
history.29 What, exactly, are the conditions for the possibility of this state of 
affairs?  
In response, one philosophical tradition has been attracted to the 
explanation that turns on the existence of a perfect language in some form. 
Bacon, for example, sought to eliminate the imperfections of empirical 
languages as “idols.” Leibniz aimed to draw up a lexicon of universal simple 
ideas, and Walter Benjamin expressed the translator’s ideal as a messianic 
horizon for a perfect translation.30 But in assessing the prospects of the 
strategy, it is helpful to recall that Umberto Eco, in his early career, put his 
considerable intellectual abilities behind the project of developing Q-codes for 
this task. Yet, by his own admission Eco failed to achieve that aim because the 
supposed “imperfections” of natural languages are exactly those features that 
allow it to function in ordinary life. The theoretically perfect language, then, 
looks unworkable as a solution. What is one to do about this result? 
 In response, Ricoeur follows Donald Davison’s approach in his essay 
“Theoretically Difficult, Hard and Practically Simple, Easy.”31 While it is 
theoretically difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain the conditions for the 
possibility of linguistic translation, it proves practically simple, as it has been 
done everywhere humans from different linguistic backgrounds have met. If 
one accepts this response, then, the impasse of translation theory finds a 
passageway in practice. 
 Because Ricoeur follows Davidson’s pragmatism for the model of 
translation, then, structuralist explanation plays no role in his reflective 
inquiry. Rather, one begins with a given, in this case the plurality of 
languages, confronts a theoretical impasse, the difficulty in explaining the 
conditions for the possibility of translation, and then is returned to the 
practice of translation as a sort of second naiveté. This passageway, however, 
requires a sort of philosophical payment in exchange. For the practice of 
translation cannot operate in the way of Ricoeur’s earlier understanding of 
appropriation. Rather, translation in practice is made possible by a series of 
its own conditions. 
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 Ricoeur identifies three of these. Taken logically, the first is a desire to 
translate. “This desire,” Ricoeur writes, “goes beyond constraint and 
usefulness.”32 Why did Luther wish to “Germanize” the Bible that he thought 
was held captive by St. Jerome’s Latin? Why did Hölderlin seek to write Greek 
in German? Why did Schleirermacher translate Plato once again? The answer 
is that each sought to become better, to broaden their own horizon. As 
Hölderlin himself writes: “What is one’s own must be learned as well as what 
is foreign.”33 Of course, this basic desire has its own conditions. Because one 
cannot aim at a pure language or a perfect translation, one must hope to find 
an equivalence without identity, which is the second condition.34 In this way 
one can remain faithful to the original sense, not betray it, but at the same time 
not replicate it, as if a perfect translation were possible. Finally, if one is to 
achieve this end, equivalence without identity, an ethical condition enters. “It 
seems to me,” Ricoeur writes,  
that translation sets us not only intellectual work, 
theoretical or practical, but also an ethical problem. 
Bringing the reader to the author, bringing the author to the 
reader, at the risk of serving and of betraying two masters: 
this is to practice what I like to call linguistic hospitality. It is 
this which serves as a model for other forms of hospitality 
that I think resemble it.35 
The practical pass for translation thus requires a final, ethical condition. 
Appropriation for this model of hermeneutics, as a result, must be of a 
different sort than that which is at stake in Ricoeur’s other models, since it 
cannot be simply cognitive, simply a matter of epistemology. 
 Because the reflective arc at work in translation makes use of different 
conditions than Ricoeur’s hermeneutic circle in other works, and because it 
has no place for structuralist explanation, the collapse challenge does not 
affect the model of translation.  One might worry, however, that it is not as 
effective in achieving the aims of hermeneutic reflection. To put the point in 
Heideggerian language, does Ricoeur’s translation model also point a way to 
the limits of thought, to the verge where the Being of beings might be 
assessed? Is it, in short, up to the task of Heidegger’s thought?  
Bearing in mind the differences between Ricoeur and Heidegger on 
Events, I think that it does. As a result, it points a way forward for the tradition 
of philosophical hermeneutics. To understand why, it is helpful to look at the 
limit case of translation: the untranslatable. 
 To explain what Ricoeur has in mind, it is helpful to start with a specific 
case of untranslatability. In broaching the topic, Ricoeur accepts François 
Jullien’s claim “that Chinese is the absolute other of Greek—that knowledge 
of the inside of Chinese amounts to a deconstruction of what is outside, of 
what is exterior, i.e. thinking and speaking Greek.”36 The reason this is so, 
Jullien argues, is that Chinese does not have tenses as one conceives of them 
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in the “West.” There are seasons, occasions, roots, leaves, springs, and 
incoming tides, but no “time” with its neat separation of tense and aspect as 
one finds it in Greek, and which Aristotle could then assess and call the 
number of motion in book IV of his Physics. What, then, is the translator to do 
when faced with a conceptual chasm of this sort? 
 For Ricoeur, this is the place from which the Being of beings might 
emerge. For when one faces what is truly untranslatable, on must give up the 
idea of prior meaning.37 There exists no such thing in the target language of 
translation, so that one cannot aim to produce a term which functions as an 
identity without equivalence. Rather, one first starts with a global 
understanding of both worlds, and then, moving downward from that view 
to the specifics of the text, one aims to construct a comparable term, which 
serves as a sort of bridge between the two worlds.38 If one follows Ricoeur 
through this process, then in translating the untranslatable one’s thought does 
more than come upon the verge of the Being of beings. Rather, in constructing 
comparables, the translator effects an Event in making a new culture.39 
Ricoeur puts the matter as follows: 
Is that not what happened in several periods of our own 
culture, when the Seventy translated the Hebrew Bible into 
Greek, into what we call the Septuagint, something that 
Hebrew specialists alone can criticize at their leisure? And 
St. Jerome did it again with the Vulgate, construction of a 
Latin comparable. But before Jerome the Latins had created 
comparables, by deciding for all of us that aretē was 
translated by virtus, polis by urbs and politēs by civis. To 
remain in the biblical domain, we could say that Luther not 
only constructed a comparable in translating the Bible into 
German, in “germanizing” it, as he dared to say, in the face 
of St Jerome’s Latin, but created the German language, as 
comparable to Latin, to the Greek of the Septuagint, and to 
the Hebrew of the Bible.40 
Unlike Heidegger, for whom humans had no agency in effecting the 
shifting of the Being of beings, Ricoeur thus understands the act of translation, 
in the construction of comparables for untranslatable chasms, to be an Event. 
And for Ricoeur, we can name the agents of these events, and they include the 
Seventy, Jerome, and Luther.41 
 Following Ricoeur through the model of translation suggests a whole 
range of new avenues for philosophical thought, for it suggests that doing 
philosophical work at these untranslatable intersections would constitute a 
most profitable activity. One might do particularly well, for example, to 
examine the philosophy of the Aztecs, since Nahuatl has no term for “to be,” 
nor any grammatical construction for it. Their metaphysics, as a result, cannot 
be an ontology in the etymological sense of the word. Neither does it a have a 
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term for “to have,” nor even “words” as we know them in Indo-European 
languages. It has, rather, wordal sentences or “nuclear clauses.”42 
 This suggestion is, at present, but a roughly articulated intuition about 
how hermeneutical philosophy might proceed by following Ricoeur’s 
translation model. Yet, I think I can make this intuition more concrete by 
specifying two closely related paths that follow on its course: one by 
comparative philosophy and another by syncretic philosophy. 
Comparative Philosophy 
In a provocative piece entitled “If Philosophy Won’t Diversify, Let’s Call 
It What It Really Is,” written for the New York Times, Bryan Van Norden and 
Jay Garfield argued that most philosophy departments ought to be retitled 
“Departments of Anglo-European Philosophy.” The failure to represent the 
world’s philosophical traditions in departments of philosophy, they argue, 
simply cannot be explained on the basis of sound philosophical method. Good 
philosophical reflection must engage with all relevant participants, especially 
the challenging views of other cultures, and philosophy as it is practiced does 
not do that.  
What emerged from the response to their provocation was a book, 
entitled Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto. In the course of his 
extended argument, Van Norden not only rebuts any of the supposed reasons 
that would support the narrow circumscription of philosophy as one finds in 
Europe and North America, but also develops how a better form of 
philosophy might be practiced when he compares the world’s traditions of 
philosophy on specific points. It is this comparative activity that I think might 
fruitfully follow Ricoeur’s translation model. To understand why, it is helpful 
to make use of a specific case. 
 Van Norden devotes a section of the book to the comparative analysis 
of Aristotelian virtue ethics and Confucian virtue ethics. Both of these 
traditions, he notes, agree with the MacIntyrean criticism of modern moral 
philosophy, namely that it tries to make sense of our obligations from an 
inherited and conceptually incoherent model of human ethical 
development.43 To recall MacIntyre’s argument, on the Aristotelian scheme, 
ethical progression may be understood to take three separate stages. One 
begins with an analysis of how one presently is, the first stage, and how one 
could be if one achieved one’s end (telos) as a human, in the third stage.44 It is 
the virtues that help one to actualize one’s presently potential state, and so 
enable one to live a good life. As a result, their cultivation makes for a second 
and pivotal stage. MacIntyre argues that the demise of teleology, with the rise 
of the modern scientific revolution, made Aristotle’s outlook implausible. As 
a result, philosophers during the early modern period were forced to make 
sense of the second component of the three-part structure, the virtues and 
their development, without the goal they were supposed to foster. They tried, 
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as a result, to found them on the first stage, which is untutored human nature. 
But any such attempt was bound to fail, since the virtues, reconceived as 
obligations (or Kantian duties) were just those activities designed to 
contravene one’s state as one presently was. The task for contemporary ethics, 
as MacIntyre envisages it, is thus to reconceive of teleology in a way that does 
not turn on Aristotle’s problematic metaphysical biology. 
 The Confucian virtue ethical tradition largely agrees with this 
assessment and may be profitably understood as an alternative view on how 
the virtues are to be conceived for the performance of a good life. Van Norden 
notes, however, that Aristotle’s account of habituation, the process by which 
a person goes from the state in which they are to the telos of their nature, is 
underarticulated in his work.45 It is at this point, Van Norden suggests, that 
the Confucian tradition might offer some special help. 
 In the Confucian tradition, what is only a minor topic for Aristotle takes 
on an elaborate focus. To simplify the wealth of arguments, Van Norden 
argues that one may discern three models of human ethical development 
among various Confucian philosophers: the reform model, the development 
model, and the discovery model. On the reform model “human nature has no 
active disposition toward virtue, so it must be reshaped through education 
and behavior to acquire” the behavior appropriate to our human end.46 The 
metaphor that Xunzi proposes is that human nature is like crooked timber, 
which must undergo significant treatment to be straightened for the right 
purpose. Proponents of the development model, by contrast, “claim that 
humans innately have incipient dispositions toward virtuous feeling, 
cognition and behavior. Ethical cultivation [then] is a matter of nurturing 
these nascent dispositions.”47 Mengzi, who is notably close to Rousseau on 
this point, suggests that humans are thus best conceived as “sprouts” that 
need only the proper care to grow well. 
 If the first two models of human development find some analogues 
among “Western” philosophers, then the third, the discovery model, is only 
superficially represented. It holds that humans have already the virtues fully 
formed, that they have them innately, and that the task is only to learn to 
exercise them. Metaphors used are often visual. Lu Xiangshan writes, “[t]he 
Pattern of the Way is simply right in front of your eyes.”48 
 It is unclear, exactly, where Aristotle would fit in this scheme. The 
quasi-Rousseauian view of the developmental model is likely too sanguine 
for him, but the reform model is likely too cynical about human beings. 
Nothing in Aristotle’s thought suggests that he thought of ethical 
development in the way that the discovery model suggests, but, and this is a 
point that holds for all of them, perhaps new and interesting forms of virtue 
ethics could be developed from this comparison and their synthesis. For the 
present purposes, it is perhaps helpful to hold in mind this third option, one 
where the pupil is taught nothing about virtue except how to wash away the 
S e b a s t i a n  P u r c e l l  |  5 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVIII, No 2 (2020)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2020.935 
world’s encumbrances that are preventing her from exercising her innate 
abilities. 
 With that view of Aristotelian-Confucianism in mind, we are in a 
position to answer the question that is guiding the present portion of the 
essay: How does comparative philosophy make use of Ricoeur’s translation 
model? Only a few terms are literally being compared, but the conceptual 
work required is just like the construction of comparables that Ricoeur 
articulates. The comparison begins with a given, namely an agreement on the 
task of virtue ethical development. One moves to an untranslatable, namely a 
whole series of models used for ethical development that have at best only 
echoes in the West. Finally, one works towards a bridge notion, a comparable 
sense of virtue ethical development, a sort of Aristotelian-Confucianism. If 
done well, one effects an Event in thought. 
Syncretic Philosophy 
A turn to comparative philosophy is likely the most obvious of the ways 
to make use of Ricoeur’s translation model of reflection. An option that has 
gone unnoticed thus far makes use of reflection that is situated not between 
philosophical traditions, but on a work that is itself between such traditions. 
In order to explain what I have in mind, it is helpful to recall just in what 
historical and religious syncretism consists. Perhaps the simplest explanation 
can be relayed in a story.  
While travelling in Peru for some research, I noticed that on the tops of 
many houses one could see a set of figurines which consisted of a Christian 
cross, surrounded by flowers, and flanked by two bulls. Most commonly, all 
these figurines were made of metal and welded together at the base. When I 
inquired about the figurines, I learned from the locals that these were 
considered the home’s guardian spirits. When I asked why the bulls were 
used, and why they were on top of the roofs, I was told that they were 
introduced as a replacement for the condor after the Spaniards. In the Incan 
conception of the world, the condor played the role of connecting the earth 
and the various domains of the heavens, and so naturally found a place on a 
home’s roof. The Spanish bulls, however, came to be the dominant animal of 
livelihood for many, and in order to avoid persecution for paganism, many 
Incans changed their former religious symbols. Also, a cross was introduced, 
to signal protection by Jesus Christ, and not only by bulls or guardian spirits. 
 This practice of placing bulls and crosses on top of one’s home is thus 
thoroughly syncretic—rather uneasily blending elements from the conceptual 
repertoires of the Christian and Incan worldviews, without finding some 
higher mode of synthesis that would reconcile their differences as Hegelian 
sublating (aufheben) would. For the same reasons, syncretic topics appear to 
function in a way quite like Ricoeur’s constructed comparables. Are there 
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philosophical cases of this sort of syncretism? If so, what might we learn by 
reflecting on these events in thought?49 
 There do look to be such cases of syncretic philosophy. In fact, in the 
decades after the Spaniards invaded what is present-day Mexico, there looks 
to have been many of these pieces. I do not mean the new works preserved in 
Nahuatl, but written in Latin letters, such as the Florentine Codex, since those 
fairly accurately represent pre-conquest Aztec views. I mean rather pieces that 
emerged in the early part of what linguistic experts call stage 3 Nahuatl.50 At 
this stage, the language changed to include prepositions, thus marking a 
generational change in the making.51 
 Among the possible pieces, I think that what is called the Codex 
Mexicanus serves as an exemplary text of syncretic philosophy. Written 
between 1578 and 1583, the work blends the European Reportorio almanac 
with the Aztec’s native tonalamatl, or day-count calendar.52 The work is 
largely composed of images in a European style but is put to the purposes that 
native imagery would have served. It also includes some inscriptions in Latin 
letters to guide the reader. From a philosophical point of view, the work is 
important because it aims to reconcile, albeit imperfectly, competing 
conceptions of time: calendric or seasonal time used for harvesting, universal 
history, and ritual or sacred time. 
 In order to understand the stakes of the authors’ integration, it is helpful 
to recall that the Aztecs made use of two calendars that were interrelated. The 
first of these, the 365-day (xihuitl) calendar was used for keeping track of the 
seasons for harvesting. It consisted of eighteen months of twenty days with 
five unlucky days, called nemontemi, added at the end.53 This calendar could 
be corrected for leap years, as the Maya had, centuries earlier, completed a 
more elaborate calendar that included those observations. The other calendar 
was the tonalpohualli, literally the day-count. This was the ritual calendar that 
the Aztecs used to schedule festivities and important ceremonies. It made use 
of a thirteen-day “week,” which the Spaniards called trecenas, and the twenty-
day month. Given the structure of this calendar, it would take 260 days for the 
cycle to repeat again.54 Finally, these two calendars were conceived to operate 
together, so that each day would be uniquely designated in the 260-day 
calendar and in the yearly 365-day calendar. This cycle would take fifty-two 
years to complete, called the calendar round, and was roughly equivalent to 
our century. 
 Although the Aztec calendrical system is foreign to our present record 
keeping, we also use a combination of two such calendars: the perpetual 365-
day calendar and the school year. The Christian Spaniards who first 
encountered the Aztecs similarly made use made use of a profane 365-day 
calendar, and mapped a host of sacred festivals, by way of saints’ days, into 
each of the months—nearly one for every day of the year.55 
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 As a result of these structures, it proved relatively simple for the authors 
of the Codex Mexicanus to map their 365-day xihuitl into the Domincan 365-
day perpetual calendar. Most of the Aztec monthly festivals could be similarly 
mapped, so that Christian Saints could be celebrated when former pagan 
forces were.56 At this level, then, the work is mostly synthetic, as a complete 
correspondence proved possible. 
 With respect to universal history, by contrast, no synthesis proved 
workable. Mesoamerican cultures combined their myths of cosmic origins 
with the history of their people in a way that is a little like the opening books 
of Genesis. Many of these appear as annals, which record complex 
genealogies that stem, supposedly, from the first people to emerge in our 
historical era that they called the fifth sun. The divinity of this lineage in one 
way served to legitimate ruling families (pages 16–17),57 but in another 
respect, it played an important role in explaining the meaning of human 
existence. The reason is that it placed their lives within a larger historical arc, 
comparable to the sort of universal history that St. Augustine sketches in the 
City of God.58 It explains why we are here and for what we might hope. 
 Yet the Aztec sense of our place in history is deeply incompatible with 
the Christian outlook. They had no soteriological or eschatological dimension 
to their myths or genealogies and held instead that our age would come to 
destruction like the previous four. Since their god, teotl, was nothing more 
than nature, it made no sense that a transcendent being could come to save us 
from our fate. Where no clear reconciliation proved possible, the authors thus 
subordinated their history to the Christian outlook, adding the arrival of the 
Spaniards at the end of their histories, and depicting their triumph as the just 
triumph of Christianity in its soteriological role.59 
 It is notable both that many of the final pages of the Codex Mexicanus are 
missing, and that others look to have been whitewashed because they 
depicted a message not in keeping with the Christian view political officials 
required. The work may have, then, also signaled a different message. The 
Mayan Popul Vuh, when confronted with the same task, chooses the 
alternative path. Rather than complete the task proposed at the outset of the 
work, the narrative ends abruptly, stating:  
This is enough about the being of Quiché, given that there 
is no longer a place to see it. There is the original book and 
ancient writing owned by the lords, now lost, but even so, 
everything has been completed here concerning Quiché, 
which is now named Santa Cruz.60 
The Mayan authors, then, clearly identify the end of their narrative as a 
loss of their civilization. The Mexicanus authors may have thought similarly, 
but the book that we have available clearly reconciles the Aztec’s conquest 
with their place in a Christian history. 
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 The third sense of time at work in the text, the sacred time enacted in 
ritual, proves to be altogether irreconcilable with the Christian sense, and as 
a result poses the most interest for philosophers. Recorded on pages 13 and 
14 of the codex are a portion of the native tonalpohualli, the 260-day calendar, 
which would have carried the burden of regulating feasts, fasts, and other 
rituals among the pre-Columbian Aztecs. The difficulty is that while the 365-
day xiuhpohualli is easily mapped into the perpetual calendar, this one is not. 
Commenting on the topic Lori Diel writes that “these dates do not match the 
dates of the monthly festivals noted in the perpetual calendar on Mexicanus 
pages 1–8.”61 As a result, the work merely juxtaposes this (partial) calendar 
with the others. 
 The philosophical question that emerges is whether there is some 
deeper irreconcilability between the exclusively native tonalpohualli and the 
Christian sense of time. Without the space to develop a complete answer, I 
venture the position that the Aztec sense of time could not be reconciled with 
a view of time at work in the Christianized perpetual calendar, because the 
Aztecs conceived of time as a basic constitutive relation that made up beings 
in our world—trees, people, deer, and the like. At base, teotl takes concrete 
form as ometeotl, in existing relations of doubling activities.62 One of these 
doubling activities is space, beginning with cardinal coordinates (giving 
primacy to East and West), and another is time, which is progressively 
doubled through its interlinking cycles (e.g. the thirteenth day and the 
twentieth day). Aztec relational metaphysics thus appears to have implied a 
different sense of time, one which did not sit easily with the Christian time. 
To put this same point in a broader metaphysical context, time, God and every 
other being are conceived immanently for the Aztecs, and that metaphysical 
view stands in deep opposition to the transcendent Christian view. 
 Given these points, how exactly is the Codex Mexicanus a philosophical 
comparable? Considered as an historical artifact, the work is a syncretic 
production that brings together the native tonalamatl and the Spanish 
reportorio—both of which were works that provided instruction on how to live 
on a daily basis by coordinating an individual’s actions within their 
community and a broader universal history. While the work endeavors to 
integrate the senses of time at work in these different metaphysical outlooks, 
it is the metaphysical failure to integrate these views which suggests how the 
book is an ethical success. What the manual provides is something new, 
namely a sense of how to live in two worlds.63 For this life is one that will 
inevitably be split because the temporal meaning of the events that coordinate 
the lives of the indigenous under Spanish rule cannot be uniformly integrated. 
In this sense, the work is both a comparable text and a comparable 
philosophical outlook. Moreover, it constitutes an event in thought and by the 
same stroke sounds a basic existential problem that will be addressed by 
Mexican philosophers up to the present: how is one to live a split existence? 
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Samuel Ramos, Octavio Paz, and Gloria Anzaldúa will all take up this 
question in the twentieth century, venturing their own answers.64 
Concluding Thoughts 
Philosophical hermeneutics was born when a method of Biblical exegesis 
was grafted onto a philosophical method for answering the basic questions of 
existence, onto Husserl’s phenomenological program. Yet the initial form that 
this project took, as Heidegger develops it in Being and Time, was not able to 
accomplish the tasks that it set for itself by the standards that it also took to 
be appropriate. When interpreting, or explicating, the moods of human 
existence (Dasein) by way of regressive questioning, Heidegger took on the 
task of digging beneath, or questioning back from, the sense of truth at work 
in the sciences. Yet his approach not only repeated the strategy that was 
typical of “Western” philosophy, turning to an account of the human being 
just as Descartes and Kant had done, but also wrongly assumed that the sense 
of truth at work in the so-called “ontic” disciplines was static and accretional. 
Ricoeur hoped to remedy this defect by placing a form of explanation—the 
activity of the sciences—within the arc of hermeneutic reflection itself, rather 
than keep it outside the process. The difficulty Ricoeur encounters is that the 
mode of explanation that he used was structuralist, and this form has itself 
not only lost credibility, but also proves to be too unidimensional for the sort 
of work philosophers would like to do. Davidson and Kearney have both 
developed their own replacement models for the explanatory moment in 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic arc, articulating an intersectional, and a carnal 
hermeneutics, respectively. They do succeed in saving the enterprise of 
phenomenological hermeneutics, then, but the present essay has been 
animated by the pursuit of a mode of hermeneutical reflection that comes 
from Ricoeur’s own work. Is there a workable model in his thought 
somewhere? 
 I have argued that there is, and that it may be found in Ricoeur’s later 
account of translation as a practice of hermeneutic reflection. This model uses 
the practice of translation, which seeks to find identities without equivalences, 
in the role of explanation for hermeneutic reflection. At the limit case, where 
one translates between untranslatable languages, the translator constructs 
comparables that enable thought to move between what cannot otherwise be 
navigated, and in doing so effects an Event in the Being of beings. It is these 
Events after all, those like Luther’s translation of the Bible, that form a culture, 
and so provide the prereflective backdrop to make sense of the beings that 
surround us in the world. 
 If this analysis proves accurate, then there is a distinctly Ricoeurean 
way forward beyond the collapse challenge that Davidson articulates. In fact, 
I think there are two such paths. One aims to produce comparables of 
philosophical thought through the activity of comparative philosophy. The 
case examined suggests that an Aristotelian-Confucianism might conceive of  
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the development of habits along the discovery model, such that each person 
is always already in possession of the abilities to act virtuously, but that they 
are encumbered by their circumstances and unable to use them. Meditation, 
then, might prove a viable path to virtue. The resulting conception produces 
an Event in thought, one which develops a new notion that allows one to 
make sense of the relation between the divergent frameworks, but which 
neither would independently endorse. One may think of this avenue as the 
synthetic approach. 
 The other path is diremptive, keeping different frameworks apart, and 
insisting on their irreconcilability. Yet, it finds a solution for that impasse in a 
different domain, or at a different level of sense, and in this way constructs a 
comparable. The case examined is how to live according to the Codex 
Mexicanus. Of the three sorts of time at work in the codex, where time is 
supposed to give a sense of how to coordinate one’s actions in the social and 
historical world, only two proved possible to integrate. The third, the sense of 
sacred time found in the tonalpohualli and the Christian schedule of saint’s 
days, could not be reconciled metaphysically because the notions at work turn 
on different views of what there is. The Aztec view is a relational metaphysics, 
one without substances, and conceived immanently. The Christian view is 
both a substance metaphysics and conceived transcendently. Yet this 
metaphysical impasse finds its solution in another domain, at the level of 
ethical life. For what the manual shows the indigenous reader is how she will 
have to live by two forms of time, two senses of human socialization, and two 
ideas about the sacred. The comparable at work here allows one to make sense 
of the mutually disjointed worlds, and constitutes an Event in ethical thought, 
as it announces the basic problematic that philosophers in Mexico (and Latin 
America more broadly) will address up to the present. 
 I suggested at the beginning of the essay that this solution opens 
hermeneutic philosophy up to the new turn in philosophical scholarship 
towards the world’s great traditions. The comparative and syncretic 
approaches, I think, have outlined what I intended. But there is a further 
implication that follows for future research in this vein. For it suggests a 
difference in approach to philosophical topics.  
To explain what I mean, consider the difference between the activity of 
research in the hermeneutic tradition and scholarship that has followed in the 
wake of Michel Foucault’s thought. Broadly, scholarship in the tradition of 
hermeneutic philosophy has been focused on explicating and defending the 
texts of major proponents, or in applying their thought to individual topics. 
What has not generally been done, especially with Ricoeur’s thought, is to use 
it as a way to read and interpret other texts. Consider the difference with 
Foucault. Ian Hacking, for example, uses a Foucauldean method to examine 
how “madness” has been socially constructed, and so cannot be considered 
natural in the ways that much medical practice takes it to be.65 Mark Jordan 
has used Foucault’s approach to explain how the Old Testament story of 
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Sodom and Gomorrah came to have anything to do with a sexual activity, 
since the primary sin at work in the text centers on the rights of guests and 
hosts.66 Both authors reference Foucault’s thought, but both are more 
interested in using his thought for other ends. 
 If the above analysis is broadly accurate, then the turn to world 
philosophy suggested at the same time opens two paths of research beyond 
what predominates in much hermeneutic thought. The avenues proposed 
look backwards to Ricoeur as a guide, but forwards to other texts, materials, 
and traditions. Our aim will be to forge the new, to effect Events of thought, 
by philosophical translation in the way that the Seventy did, or that Martin 
Luther did. This new approach, then, promises to be both more inclusive with 
respect to the world’s philosophies, and more impactful with respect to our 
reflection within that world. 
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41 The difference between Cassin and Ricoeur on this point is again worth noting. 
Cassin’s Vocabulaire is her way of deconstructing the European tradition of 
philosophy, of bringing it to reflect on the verge of what is unthinkable. She and her 
team do this, rather than Heidegger’s attempt to re-read all the individual thinkers 
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Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Fifteenth through Eighteenth 
Centuries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) for more detail. 
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Press, 2018), 8. 
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62 For more on this point, see Sebastian Purcell, “On What there ‘Is’: Aristotle and 
the Aztecs on Being and Existence,” APA Newsletter on Native American and 
Indigenous Philosophy, vol. 18 (2018): 11–23. 
63 Again, this point brings the present reflection close to Barbara Cassin’s work on 
hospitality and nostalgia in Nostalgia: When Are We Ever At Home?, trans. Pascale-
Anne Brault (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016). In her concluding essay she 
brings a variety of threads together writing: “‘The faltering equivocity’ has become a 
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64 I have in mind the following works in particular: Samuel Ramos, El Perfil Del 
Hombre Y La Cultura En México (Mexico City: Editorial Planeta, 1993), Octavio Paz, 
El Laberinto de la Soledad in Octavio Paz Obras Completas V (Mexico City: Fondo de 
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Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
66 Mark Jordan’s most sustained development of this point may be found in his The 
Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997). 
